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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OP THE

STATE OF UTAH
BENEVOLENT AND PROTECTIVE
ORDER OF ELKS, NO. 85,
Petitioner,
vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF
EQUALIZATION and E A R L M.
BAKER, SALT LAKE COUNTY
ASSESSOR,
and
TAX COMMISSION OF THE STATE
OF UTAH,
Respondents.

OaseNo.
13826

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS, SALT LAKE COUNTY
BOARD OF EQUALIZATION AND
SALT LAKE COUNTY ASSESSOR
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Petitioner, in his brief, incorrectly states the nature
of the case to be a review of the proceedings, decisions
and orders of the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization. This is an original action in certiorari to review the
proceedings, decisions and order of the State Tax Com-
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mission of Utah wherein the Tax Commission, pursuant
to a formal hearing, sustained the decision of the Salt
Lake County Board of Equalization determining that
certain properties located in Salt Lake County and owned
by the Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks, Lodge
No. 85, were not entitled to an exemption from ad valorem
property taxes for the year 1973.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent, Salt Ijake County, seeks affirmation of
the decision of the State Tax Commission of Utah upholding the decision of the County Board of Equalization
wherein said County B>oard found that the improved real
property owned by the petitioner was not being used exclusively for charitable purposes as the term is defined
by Article XIII, Section 2, of the Constitution of the
State of Utah, and Utah Code Annotated, Sections 592-1, 59-2-30 and 59-2-31, and that the property of petitioner was subject to property taxes for the calendar year
1973.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Petitioner, B. P. 0. E. No. 85, is a fraternal organization and a corporation existing under and by virtue of
the laws of the State of Utah.
The Salt Lake County Board of Equalization is a
board of Salt Lake County Commissioners existing by
virtue of the laws of the State of Utah.
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Petitioner, B. P. O. E. No. 85, is the owner of certain
improved property located at 139 East South Temple,
Salt Lake City, Utah, more commonly known as the Elks'
Lodge. During the year 1973, petitioner filed an application for exemption with the Salt Lake County Board of
Equalization (T-4 through T-38). On the 2nd day of
July, 1973, the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization
issued its written decision specifically finding and concluding as follows:
1. The appellant, Salt Lake Lodge No. 85,
Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks of the
United States, is a Utah non-profit corporation
incorporated in 1950. It is also a subordinate
lodge of the National Order of Elks.
2. The purposes and objects for which the
corporation was formed are fraternal, charitable,
patriotic, historical and educational.
3. To further these purposes, the corporation is authorized to: purchase, acquire, hold
or convey all such real and personal property
as may be necessary to carry on or promote the
purposes of the organization.
4. Applicant's property consists of two
buildings — a lodge building and an office building. The office building is not used for lodge purposes, but is leased for $700 per month. The
lodge building is used primarily by and for the
membership and their families and contains a
lounge and dining room facilities for the benefit
of the members.
5. The nature and extent of the activities
on the property claimed to be exempt is also in-
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dicated by the supporting financial data of the
lodge which was filed with the application. The
activities indicated therein clearly demonstrate
that the overall primary use of applicant's property is to produce rental and other income and
for the fraternal and social benefit of the lodge,
its members and their families, and any charitable use is merely incidental to the primary use
by the lodge, its members and their families.
CONCLUSION:
1. The real property and improvements
owned by the applicant [is] not used exclusively
for charitable purposes within the meaning of
Article XIII, Section 2, of the Constitution of
the State of Utah, and Sections 59-2-1, 59-2-30
and 59-2-31, Utah Code Annotated, as amended.
Petitioner, B. P. 0. E.> No. 85, filed a notice of appeal
with the Tax Commission of Utah, thereby appealing
the decision of the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization to tax the property owned by B. P. 0. E., No. 85
(T-l-2).
Thereafter, a formal hearing was held before the
Tax Commission of Utah on the 2nd day of July, 1974
(T-49).
On the 26th day of August, 1974, the Tax Commission issued its written Findings of Pact and Conclusions
of Law (T-51-53). rFhe pertinent portions of the Findings and Conclusions of the Tax Commission are as follows:
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"4. The Elks' Lodge building in question is
made up of five floors, plus a basement constituting six floors — the use of which includes a
large variety of social functions, including dinner, dancing, liquor consumption, organization
meetings, as well as some charitable functions,
which take place in the Elks' Lodge building
each year.
5. The third floor of the Elks' Lodge building,
known as the Goodwill Room, is operated exclusively for charitable purposes and the distribution of clothing to the needy.
6. Proceeds from food sales, liquor and cigar
consumption on the premises, after expenses,
go into a general fund, to be in part used for the
benefit of different charitable programs of appellants.
7. In fiscal 1973, approximately $300,000.00
gross revenue was received by appellant, $39,000.00 of which was received specifically for charitable purposes and $29,000.00 of which was
actually expended for charitable purposes.
8. Appellant performs patriotic, charitable and
civic functions, which include an annual Christmas party for the crippled and handicapped;
Elks' Boys and Girls Club, scouts, youth scholarship programs, foreign exchange students programs, veterans remembrance programs — all
of which renders a great service to the community.
9. The majority of charitable functions fulfilled
by appellant are through cash donations of members, plus a multitude of man-hours contributed
outside of the premises in question.
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10. Other than the Goodwill Room on the third
floor of the building and other than some organization functions, most other charitable functions
are held at locations and buildings other than
the buildings here in question.
11. The appellant participates in many other
civic, patriotic and worthwhile activities, but
such participation does not constitute the exclusive charitable u*$e of the property.
12. Appellant makes no contention that its
property is used for religious purposes, but maintains that its charitable functions within and
without the premises render appellant's premises tax exempt."
From the foregoing factual determination made by
the Tax Commission of Utah pursuant to its formal hearing, the following Conclusions of Law were issued:
"1. Article XIII, Section 2, of the Utah State
Constitution, providing that lots with buildings
thereon used exclusively for either religious worship or charitable purposes shall be exempt from
taxation, (See, also, Utah Code Annotated, Section 58-21-1 (1953)) is applicable to the case at
hand.
2. Appellant's case of Elks v. Groesbeck, 40
Utah 8, is not SLpplicable to the present situation, since a substantial portion of appellant's
area is used for membership, social and recreational or is unused for any purpose, and the
above cited case held that members' activities
were incidental to its charitable use and is, therefore, differentiated from the present situation.
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3. Exemption from ad valorem property taxes
in 'the State of Utah is based upon actual use of
the property in question and not on the use of
income derived from the operations thereon, or
on participation in civic and patriotic functions.
4. Appellant's property in question during the
calendar year 1973 was not used exclusively for
charitable or religious purposes. The decision of
the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization
should be, therefore, affirmed."
Based upon its Findings and Conclusions, the Tax Commission issued its decision affirming the decision of the
Salt Lake County Board of Equalization in\ ilk/ 2(>l;fi
day of August, 1974 (T-55).
Petitioner, in its brief, does not dispute or challenge
the factual determinations made by the Tax Commission
of Utah, but in effect, asserts that the legal conclusions
of the Commission with respect to said facts are incorrect. Respondent, therefore, asserts that the <*:ii\ ope*
ative facts pertinent to the disposition of this appeal ,ws<!
before this Honorable Court are those finding <>f fact
made by the Commission.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ELKS' LODGE WAS NOT BEING USED
EXCLUSIVELY FOR CHARITABLE PURPOSES TO QUALIFY IT FOR EXEMPTION
FROM TAXATION UNDER AND BY VIR-
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TUE OF ARTICLE XIII OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH, AND SECTION 58-2-1,
UTAH CODE A N N O T A T E D , 1953, AS
AMENDED.
The sole question to be resolved in this case is
whether the building and premises known as Elks' Lodge
No. 85 have been used exclusively for charitable purposes, as shown by the facts adduced in this case, under
and by virtue of Article XIII, Section 2, of the Constitution of Utah and Section 59-2-1, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended.
Respondent, Salt Lake County, emphatically contends that Elks' Lodge No. 85 has not met the burden
required of it to show that its property is exempt from
taxation. And the decision of the Tax Commission of
Utah should, therefore, be affirmed.
Article XIII, Section 2, of the Utah Constitution
provides, in part, as follows:
"All tangible property in the state, not exempt
under the laws of the United States, or under
this constitution, shall be taxed in proportion
to its value, to be ascertained as provided by
law. The property of the state, counties, cities,
towns, school districts, municipal corporations
and public libraries, lots with the buildings thereon used exclusively for either religious worship or
charitable purples, * * * shall be exempt from
taxation. * * *"

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9
Section 59-2-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides as follows:
"The property of the United States, of this state,
counties, cities, towns, school districts, municipal
corporations and public libraries, lots with the
buildings thereon used exclusively for either religious worship or charitable purposes, * * *
shall be exempt from taxation."
The general rule of construction regarding property
tax exemptions is that all property of whatever kind
soever and by whomsoever owned is subject to taxation.
An exemption must not be aided by judicial interpretation. The rule of strict construction applies. All doubts
must be resolved against the exemption. See Praker v.
Quinn, 64 P. 961, 23 Utah 332 (1901).
This Court has generally recognized that the exemptions from taxation granted to properties used exclusively for charitable purposes are dependent upon the
actual use of the premises. As was stated by this Court
in Friendship Manor Corporation v. Tax Commission, 26
Utah 2d 227, 487 P. 2d 1272 (1972).
"It is the use to which it puts its real property,
which is the determination of whether or not
such property is exempt. If the charitable organization does not use its real property and building thereon exclusively for charitable purposes,
such property is not exempt, notwithstanding
the fact that the owner thereof is a charitable
organization." (at page 234) (Emphasis supplied.)
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The Salt Lake County Board of Equalization found that
the activities conducted upon petitioner's premises "clearly demonstrate that the overall primary use of applicant's
property is to produce rental and other income and for
the fraternal and social benefit of the lodge, its members
and their families, and any charitable use is merely incidental to the primary use by the lodge, its members and
their families" Our Constitution, Article XIII, Section
2, requires that the property be used exclusively for charitable purposes to be exempt. Incidental use for charitable purposes is not sufficient. See Article XIII, Section 2, Constitution of Utah. The Tax Commission in
affirming the decision of the County Board of Equalization found that the majority of the charitable functions
of the organization are held at locations and buildings
other than the building here in question. And the use
of the property includes a large variety of social functions, including dinner, dancing, liquor consumption, and
organization meetings. And that the proceeds from food
sales, liquor and cigar consumption on the premises, after
expenses, go into a general fund, to be in part used for
the benefit of different charitable programs of appellant.
However, the general fund is used by the lodge to pay
all operating expenses of the lodge and it is only after
all expenses are met that any such funds might be available for charity (See T-p. 109, 112 and 113). In short,
any monies that might result from the fraternal and social
activities and use of the lodge by the members and their
guests would be available for charity only after the expenses of operations are met. Charity then is a secondary
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consideration of the overall activities conducted upon
the premises in question. This Court's attention is directed to the universal truth written by the Supreme
Court of the State of Missouri in denying an exemption to the Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks 61
years ago:
Charity is not a promiscuous mixer. Here
she modestly sitands outside or goes away and
waits; waits until the plaintiff has finished using the spacious and comfortable rooms for the
pleasures of its members; waits until the curtain
has fallen upon the last scene of the vaudeville
performance on the stage; until the dancers are
tired and have gone home; until the billiard
rooms have been deserted to the markers; until
the plaintiff has paid the cost of its own entertainment and goes out and finds her and hands
her whaitever it may have left in its own pocket.
She gets not the use of the premises but what
remains of income to the owners after they have
used it in carrying out the injunction of their
organic law, by promoting their own welfare, enhancing their own happiness, and cultivating
their own good fellowship among themselves.
See St. Louis Lodge v. Koeln, 262 Mo. 444, 171 S. W.
329 (1914). To extend the language of the Utah Constitution to a point whereby petitioner's property is
granted exemption would be contrary to the plain meaning of the language creating religious and charitable exemptions.
In order to be entitled to an exemption, the prop-
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erty exempted must be used in such a manner that the
state is relieved of a burden that it must otherwise assume. As this Court stated in Friendship Manor, supra,
at page 1277:
"The power to tax rests upon necessity and is
essential to the existence of the state, and in
order to be exempt, the state must be benefited
in some regard so as to relieve the state of some
burden."
Is the State of Utah required to provide a facility whereby members of a fraternal order may meet and have
dinner? It the State of Utah required to provide a facility whereby members of a fraternal order may hold a
dance? Is the State of Utah required to provide a facility whereby members of a fraternal order or their families may consume liquor or hold meetings? The answer
is no. As this Court stated again in Friendship Manor.
"The state does not have the obligation to provide living accommodations to persons well, able
and willing to pay for their needs."
Certainly, in the instant case, there is no obligation upon
the state to make such a facility available. To be entitled
to exemption, the physical property under consideration
must be used for charity and such exemption does not
extend to the institution per se. See Odd Fellows' Building Ass'n v. Naylor, 177 P. 214, 53 Utah 111 (1918). This
principal was perhaps most dearly discussed by the Arizona Supreme Court in 1932:
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"Applying these principles of law to the facts,
it is obvious to us that, even assuming Arizona
Lodge No. 2 is a 'charitable institution' within
the constitutional provision, the Masonic Temple is not a 'charitable institution' within the
terms of Section 3067, supra. It consists of three
lodge rooms, an auditorium, banquet rooms, offices for officials, lounge rooms, kitchen, and
various storage rooms, appropriately furnished
and prepared for use for which their names designate. None of the rooms is used in any manner for the relief of the indigent or the afflicted.
The only connection which the temple has with
such relief is that the organization which owns
it has that as one of its objects, and uses part
of its funds derived from many sources, among
which is the rental of certain portions of the
temple, for that purpose."
Conrad v. Maricopa County, 40 Arizona 390, 12
P. 2d 613 (1932) at page 615.
A distinction must, therefore, be made between those
charitable lands used directly for the purpose of charity
as opposed to those which provide income which is later
put to eleemosynary purposes. The uses of petitioner's
property in the instant case are as a parking area, for
lodge activities, liquor and cigar sales and assumption,
and otiher meetings and social and fraternal activities of
the members. The third floor from the basement is used
75% for storage and processing of clothing for indigents
and 25% for storage of petitioner's property (T-88 & 89).
The direct use of the property, therefore, is for the activities of its members. To consider the property of
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petitioner as being used exclusively for charitable purposes as that term was intended by the framers of the
Utah Constitution:
". . . would amount to an absolute perversion
of the plain meaning and intent of the framers
of the constitution and the citizens of the state
who afterwards voted for its adoption."
Odd Fellows' Building Ass'n v. Naylor, 53 Utah
111, 177 P. 214, (1918) at page 217.
Petitioner places great reliance upon the case of Salt
Lake Lodge No. 85, B. P. O. E. v. Groesbeck, 40 Utah
1, 120 P. 192 (1911), as controlling its claim for exemption, urging further that the Groesbeck case creates an
exception to the general rule of strict construction. However, as was most succinctly stated by Justice Thurman
7 years after Groesbeck:
"Much has been said in argument upon the
question as to whether or not a strict or liberal
construction should be adopted in seeking to ascertain the meaning of the constitutional provision involved. In our judgment, as contended
by respondent, 'there is no room for construction.' The language is plain, unequivocal, and
unambiguous."
Odd Fellows' v. Naylor, supra, at page 217. In addition,
respondent would assert that the Groesbeck case has
been limited by the decision of this Court in the Friendship Manor case, and further, if still viable, should be
limited to the facts of that case. As was stated by the
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Supreme Court of New Mexico in a case involving the
exempt status of an Elks' Lodge:
"Clearly, the sole question to be determined
is whether the property is used for charitable
purposes. Mountain View Home, Inc. v. State
Tax Commission, N. M. 649, 427 P. 2d 13 (1967).
This determination must necessarily depend on
the uses being made of each property which is
claimed comes within the exemption. Except to
the extent that the facts as to use are so nearly
alike as to logically compel like results, no case
can be said to constitute a cotnrolling precedent
for a case in this area." (Emphasis ours.)
Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks' Lodge No. 461
v. New Mexico Property Appraisal Department, 83 N. M.
447, 493 P. 2d 411 (1972) at page 412. That Court also
considered the question of how exemption provisions
should be construed and indicated that they should be
construed " . . . to the end that the probable intent of
the provision is effectuated and the public interests to be
subserved thereby are furthered." 493 P. 2d 411 at page
413. This Court should do no less. Respondent would
submit that the framers of our constitution recognized
the dangers inherent in a diminishing tax base. Diminution shifts a correspondingly increased burden upon those
already paying their share of the costs of government.
They should not be made to pay an indirect subsidy to
and for the benefit of those fraternal organizations that
maintain private facilities primarily for their exclusive
fraternal and social benefit. A similar approach was
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taken by the Supreme Court of Indiana in the case of
Indianapolis Elks Building Corporation v. State Board
of Tax Commissioners, 145 Ind. 522, 251 N. E. 2d 672
(1969), wherein the Court determined that the dominant
use of the Elks' Lodge property was social and, therefore, not entitled to an exemption under a statute exempting property used exclusively for charitable purposes. In that case the Court pointed out that many
of the objectives of the Elks' Lodge were also visible in
the family home and other establishments that were not
exempt from property tax. An extensive annotation regarding tax exemption of property used by fraternal associations is found in 39 A. L. R. 3d 624.
Finally, respondent would urge this Court to recognize the distinction between those persons actually performing acts of charity and those who promote charity.
During the year herein in question, petitioner received
approximately $39,000.00 in cash solely for charitable
purposes. As indicated from the record, approximately
$29,000 was expended for charitable purposes. Who then
performed the act of charity, the hundreds of people who
were solicited to purchase circus tickets, car raffle tickets
or made donations or the organization that gathered and
expended the funds? Respondent would assert that the
charity in this case was made possible not by the petitioner but by the numerous persons who supported the
programs sponsored by petitioner. They are the ones
who are charitable, not the petitioner.
Under the facts in the present case, the conclusion
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is inescapable that the property known as Elks' Lodge
No. 85 was not used exclusively for charitable purposes
as that term is defined in the Constitution of Utah and
the decision of the Tax Commission should, therefore,
be affirmed.
POINT II.
THE PARTIAL OR PERCENTAGE EXEMPTION URGED BY PETITIONER IS CONTRARY TO THE INTENT OF THE DRAFTERS OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, THE
LEGISLATIVE INTENT OF THE 1973 LEGISLATURE, AND IS NOT SUPPORTED BY
THE FACTS AS DETERMINED BY THE
TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH.
Petitioner, in its brief, has claimed alternative relief
by asserting a claim for partial exemption of its property
for the third floor "Goodwill Room".
This Court has recognized a partial exemption in
two previous cases. Those cases do contain significant
factual differences that make them readily distinguishable from the instant case.
In Parker v. Quinn, 23 U. 332, 64 P. 961 (1901), the
structure involved was a two-story building. The upper
floor was used for meetings and the performance of the
charitable work of the Relief Society. The main floor
was rented to a third party and taxed. In general, approximately 50% of the building was used for what this
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Court determined to be charitable purposes and a 50%
exemption was allowed.
In Odd Fellows' Building Ass'n v. Nay lor, 53 Utah
111, 177 P. 214 (1918), the building in question contained
three floors. The rooms on the first floor to a depth of
30 feet were rented to private concerns. The rear part
of the first floor was ranted to various tenants and was
also used in connection with the lodge halls on the second
and third floor which were exempt. Therefore, in excess
of 66-2/3% of the building was used for exempt purposes.
In the instant case, we are concerned with 75% of one
floor of a six-story building or, assuming the same approximate floor space per floor, approximately 12-1/2%
of the total structure *is being used exclusively for charitable purposes. In terms of total space allocated to
"charity", the instant case is, therefore, readily distinguishable from the Quinn case and the Odd Fellows'
case.
Respondent, Salt Lake County, agrees with the assertion made by the Tax Commission in its brief. Partial
or percentage exemptions create a great administrative
burden and are almost impossible to administer. For
example, how are the common areas such as hallways,
parking lots, eating facilities and elevators to be allocated
or apportioned. How do we treat multi-purpose rooms
or facilities that may be used for charity one day and
non-charitable activities the next day? At what percentage of charitable use do we say that the property
is not used exclusively for charitable purposes, or for
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that matter, at what percentage of charitable use do
we say that the property is in fact used exclusively for
charitable purposes? Do we allow a 5% use? Do we allow
a 10% use? How should we treat individuals in their
homes who perform charitable activities? The law does
not require that they be organized as a charity because
the exemption extends to the use of the property not
the organization. See Odd Fellows' v. Naylor, supra.
Should we then exempt the sewing room in the home
of an individual who makes wearing apparel and perhaps
quilts that are utilized for the needs of the indigent?
Should we exempt the room that is used to store discarded articles that are periodically donated to various
service organizations such as Veterans Thrift, the Junior
League Flea Market or Deseret Industries? Where do
we draw the line? Respondent would submit that the
language of Article XIII, Section 2, of the Constitution
of Utah does not allow such apportionment. That language speaks in terms of lots with buildings thereon used
exclusively for charitable purposes. There is no language
in the Constitution or the implementing statute found
in Section 59-2-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended, that would indicate that the exemption should
apply to a portion of a lot with a building thereon of
which a portion is used exclusively for charitable purposes. The constitutional provision is all inclusive as is
the statute enacted thereunder.
Finally, in the Friendship Manor case, the trial judge
had in fact granted a partial exemption to the manor
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based upon the FHA requirements governing the admittance of the tenants. Although this Court did not
direct itself specifically to that question, this Court did
reject the ruling of the trial court that a partial exemption should be allowed and went on to tax the entire
manor. The Court should do likewise in the case at bar
because to allow partial or proportionate exemptions
would lead to great albuse and would enable virtually
every organization that conducts some form of nominal
charitable activity to claim a proportionate exemption
for an isolated area of its facilities that could be claimed
to be used exclusively for its charitable purposes. Certainly, the framers of the constitution must have had
this problem in mind when they drafted Article XIII,
Section 2, which resf>omdeot respectfully submits precludes any partial or percentage exemptions such as the
one requested by petitioner in this case. Respondent,
Salt Lake County, would further support the contention
of the Tax Commission in its brief that the allowance
of a percentage or partial exemption of one building
would be contrary to the legislative intent as more clearly
indicated in the newly enacted Section 59-2-30, Utah
Cade Annotated, 1953, as amended, 1973,
Finally, petitioner Elks' Lodge in its brief argues
that the fact that the Elks' Lodge does not lease a
portion of its property and that the building in the instant case is exclusively occupied by the petitioner the
exemption should be granted. However, a reading of the
constitutional and statutory provisions relating to exemptions would clearly indicate that the exemption is
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not granted to charitable, or for that matter non-profit
corporations, merely because they do not lease their
premises. The requirement of the constitution is an
affirmative one and the burden is upon the person claiming the benefit of the exemption provision to establish
that his property is being used exclusively for charitable
purposes. The mere failure to lease one's property clearly
does not establish that claim.
CONCLUSION
Respondent, Salt Lake County, respectfully submits
to this Honorable Court that the decision of the Tax
Commission was correct in all respects, that there is
substantial evidence in the record to support the findings
and conclusions of the Tax Commission, that the conclusions of the Commission are supported by the constitutional and statutory provisions applicable to this case,
and that the decision of the Tax Commission is in harmony with previous rulings of this Court and that the
order and decision of the Tax Commission should, therefore, be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Salt Lake County Attorney
BILL THOMAS PETERS
Special Deputy County Attorney
Attorneys for Respondents,
Salt Lake County Board of
Equalization and Salt Lake
County Assessor
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